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Equicare: A Model for Quality Health Care
and Consumer Choice in State Health
System Reform
Lois Snyder*
This proposal for health system reform, known as Equicare,
was developed for the 1994 gubernatorial primary race in Pennsylvania. But incomplete access, inadequacies in public programs, inefficiencies in care, and other problems experienced in
Pennsylvania are not unique to that state. While Pennsylvania
data and financing plans support the case for this type of reform,
the proposal could be adopted in any state.
INTRODUCTION

For a while, health care was the issue of the day. Although
much of the fervor has died down, the problems still remain.
Most Americans have what is the best quality health care in the
world. However, significant issues still need to be addressed,
most notably regarding complete access to care-bringing into
the system the many individuals who are uninsured or underinsured-and in the delivery of more efficient and effective care
for all. There is great opportunity for productive change. But
care must be taken to refrain from "fixing" the parts of the system that are not broken and to preserve the innovation and high
quality that have characterized American health care.
The Clinton administration has promised to allow states flexibility in experimenting with health system reform. Congress,
too, seems committed to the idea of state flexibility, but with
less concern for federal standards than the President's initial
proposal. What follows is a health care plan designed for Penn* Lois Snyder is the Counsel for Ethics and Legal Affairs at the American College of Physicians in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. She is also a Faculty Associate at the
Center for Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania. She received her Bachelor of Arts
from the University of Pennsylvania, and her Doctor of Jurisprudence from Temple

University School of Law [evening division]. The views represented here are those of
the author.
The author would like to thank former gubernatorial candidate Sam Katz for his
commitment to these ideas, and Craig Snyder and Christine Hein for research assist-

ance and helpful reviews of an earlier draft.
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sylvania, but which could be adapted to any state. It meets current federal standards, but goes much farther to build on what
have been the strengths of the current health system. Equicare
is a progressive, proconsumer, market-based approach never
tried before. Why the name Equicare? It is premised on equity
principles, providing access for all by empowering each individual and family to freely choose health insurance tailored to their
needs.
This plan proposes universal access through guaranteed
health insurance coverage. The vast majority of families and individuals would "break even" or gain financially compared with
where they stand today, while having more and better options in
choosing their health coverage. People who need financial
assistance would be provided with vouchers or tax credits (depending on their income) for the purchase of health insurance.
There would be insurance industry reform to ensure the fair
treatement of consumers. The current employment-based approach to health benefits would be reformed. No one need ever
fear losing coverage. Competition, not rationing or government-imposed price controls, would be the force for cost
containment.
Some experts claim that market-based health care has been
tried and has failed. They are wrong. A genuine market-based
universal system has never really been tried.
Briefly, here is how Equicare would work. The state would
assure that every citizen (as an individual or family member) has
access to health care by providing a financial structure that allows everyone to purchase their own private insurance. In return, individuals and families would be required to obtain
insurance. In an invigorated health insurance marketplace, they
would be able to choose and purchase the coverage they need
and want. However, those eligible would continue to participate
in Medicare.
Employers would get out of the business of assuming risk for
health care. This is not to say they would have no involvement;
they would be encouraged to act as brokers in presenting plans
to their employees for their consideration, thus maintaining the
beneficial effects of large-group purchasing. They could continue to offer health insurance exactly as they have been, including self-insurance.
While Equicare would require all Pennsylvanians to purchase
their own insurance, it also would provide the resources for indihttp://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol5/iss1/8
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viduals and families to do so through either "health insurance
wages," vouchers, or tax credits. Employers of more than
twenty-five employees who are currently providing health insurance benefits would pay their employees tax-exempt health insurance wages from the funds they currently allocate for health
benefits, less ten percent for a state fund for vouchers, as described below. Small employers (with less than twenty-five employees) that currently provide health insurance benefits would
be required do the same but only for those employees earning
more than $25,000 per year. Employees of small businesses who
earn less than $25,000 and all others who earn less than $25,000
per year and do not receive health insurance wages (including
all medical assistance recipients) would receive vouchers from
the state to purchase insurance. Those earning more than
$25,000 but less than $40,000 per year who do not receive health
insurance wages would receive state income tax credits to help
defray the cost of health insurance.
Individuals and families would then be able to purchase insurance from the source of their choice. Any remaining health
wages could be used for out-of-pocket health care expenses (for
example, deductibles or copayments) or other forms of healthrelated insurance, such as long-term care insurance. In effect,
health care resources in the hands of individuals and families
under this plan are a "medi-save" account free from income
taxes.
Employers who provide health insurance wages would still be
able to deduct these amounts from their corporate taxes, but
would not be liable for fluctuating premium costs and would not
have to spend time and money watching utilization. Nor would
they have to make decisions about the content of policies, because the employees would be the purchasers.
I.

ONE STATE'S EXPERIENCE: WHO ARE THE UNINSURED
AND UNDERINSURED IN PENNSYLVANIA?

The first priority of health system reform must be to provide
access to adequate care for the uninsured and those without sufficient health coverage, integrating them into an improved system that serves all. So, we must consider why people are
uninsured. In Pennsylvania, the Governor's 1992 report to the
Pennsylvania Economic Development Partnership on managed
competition estimated that 1.2 million Pennsylvanians are uninPublished by LAW eCommons, 1996
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sured. 1 According to the most comprehensive study done to
date-the 1988 Lewin and Associates report for the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHCCCC)most (approximately seventy percent) of the uninsured are the
working poor and their dependents (incomes below 150% of the
poverty level) who do not qualify for medical assistance (MA).
More than one-half of uninsured adults are employed full or
part time. Approximately thirty-six percent of the low-income
uninsured are seventeen years old or younger, and one out of
every five is less than six years old.2 The proportion of uninsured in Pennsylvania is at approximately the national average.
A 1994 study by Kaagan Research Associates for Pennsylvania
Blue Cross and Blue Shield reinforced the findings of the
PHCCCC report.4
People are uninsured for many reasons. Some (of all income
levels) are employed by small businesses that do not offer health
insurance for employees. In Pennsylvania, it is estimated that
nineteen percent of businesses with less than fifty employees
(which employ 331,440 full-time workers) do not provide coverage.5 For some, it is a matter of personal choice. National statistics show that young people who pay medical expenses out of
their pockets rather than purchase insurance constitute almost
three-fifths of the much-cited thirty-seven million Americans
without health insurance. Nationally, almost forty-six percent of
the uninsured have incomes of more than $20,000 per year, seventeen percent make more than $40,000 per year, and many are
self-employed.6
Some workers are only temporarily uninsured, lacking coverage for five months or less until they find new jobs. 7 Two-thirds
1. REPORT TO THE PENNSYLVANIA ECON. DEV. PARTNERSHIP, GOVERNOR ROBERT P. CASEY, CHAIRMAN, MANAGED COMPETITION: A HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR
PENNSYLVANIA 4 (Nov. 1992) [hereinafter "GOVERNOR'S REPORT"].
2. PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT COUNCIL, HEALTH CARE
FOR THE MEDICALLY INDIGENT IN PENNSYLVANIA 1-2 (Lewin and Assocs. ed., 1988)
[hereinafter "PHCCCC REPORT"]. Note, however, that these data predate the 1993
implementation of a children's health insurance program in Pennsylvania.
3. Id. at 8.

4. PENNSYLVANIA BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN PENNSYLVANIA AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED POPULATION
(Kaagan Research Assocs., 1994) [hereinafter "PA. BCBS REPORT"].
5. WIDENER-BURROWS & ASSoCs., PENNSYLVANIA BLUE SHIELD STUDY (Nov.
1991).
6. Tony Snow, Take a Hard Look at Those Without Health Insurance, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,

7.

Apr. 23, 1993, at A35.

Id.
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lack insurance for less than one year; only fifteen to eighteen
percent lack insurance for more than two years. More than seventy-three percent of new employees who do receive coverage
at work have to wait an average of three months before they are
eligible for benefits," so they remain temporarily uninsured even
after they start working. Again, many of the uninsured are
those low-income families and individuals with assets or incomes that are too high for medical assistance eligibility. Some
uninsured Pennsylvanians are eligible for Medicaid but have not
enrolled, while others are eligible for special insurance programs
for low- and moderate-income people but have not applied. 9 Finally, some individuals have medical conditions that make them
uninsurable in the eyes of insurers.
This is not to say that the uninsured are not receiving at least
some care. They are. But it is often too little, too late, and usually the least efficient and most costly care, such as care in the
hospital emergency room. In Pennsylvania, the uninsured use
emergency room care three times more often than the insured.
About ten percent of the low-income uninsured use an emergency room as their usual source of health care. The medical
assistance population also overutilizes the emergency room. Together, the uninsured and those receiving MA identified an
emergency room or hospital outpatient department as their
usual care site in twenty and twenty-four percent of cases, respectively, versus seven percent for the privately insured.10 Nationally, after rates steadily increased for the period from 1985
to 1993, hospitals reported a decline in emergency department
visits in 1994, due to managed care and for other reasons. This
decline, however, was largest in the Pacific region. The East and
Central regions continued to report increased emergency room
utilization." Delays in care due to an inability to pay often lead
to more expensive care that might have been avoided altogether
or at least lessened with ongoing primary care.
A.

Some Context: Health Care in Pennsylvania Today

It is important to understand how health care dollars are
spent in Pennsylvania and what they buy. Total 1992-93 state
8. Greg Steinmetz, Number of UninsuredStirs Much Confusion in the Health-Care
Debate, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1993, at Al.
9. PA. BCBS REPORT, supra note 4.
10. PHCCCC REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-9.
11. AMERICAN Hosp. Ass'N Soc'Y FOR AMBULATORY

CARE PROFESSIONALS,
TRENDLINES IN AMBULATORY CARE: EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (1995).
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health appropriations were $5.07 billion; federal health care appropriations for Pennsylvania were $3.8 billion. 12 According to
the Governor's managed competition report, total health spending by Pennsylvanians in 1990 amounted to $30.5 billion, thirtytwo percent of which was paid for by individuals, twenty-eight
percent by businesses, and forty percent by federal, state, and
local governments. Total health spending for 1993 had been
projected at $41 billion,13 and, in fact, a recent report put the
figure for total personal health care
expenditures in Penn14
sylvania at $41.5 billion for the year.
Traditional measures of health status in Pennsylvania were
not unlike those for the nation: current life expectancy is 73.5
years (73.7 years for the nation); the infant mortality rate is 10.5
deaths per 1000 live births (10.4 for the nation); and low-birthweight babies constitute 6.9% of all births in Pennsylvania (the
same for the nation). However, Pennsylvania statistics were
higher in three key areas: hospital admissions per 1000 in population (155.1 in the state versus 135.9 nationally), outpatient hospital visits per 1000 (1280.6 versus 1057.5), and, perhaps most
notably, emergency room visits per 1000 (403.4 versus 361.5).15
B.

Pennsylvania Medical Assistance

About 1.5 million Pennsylvanians received health care in
1992-93 through medical assistance, which includes the federal
and state jointly funded Medicaid program for low-income
adults and children, and the state-funded health care program
for general assistance recipients. More than 1.6 million Pennsylvanians received benefits in 1993-94. These programs constituted about eighteen percent of the state's total budget for 199293, approximately $3 billion. Nationally, Medicaid expenditures
have more than doubled since 1989.16
Numbers on medical assistance spending in Pennsylvania,
however, belie an important fact-the medical assistance
shortfall, which is the difference between the actual cost of serving MA patients and what the state pays for that care. Like
12.

GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra

note 1, at 3.

13.
14.

Id. at 5.
Katharine R. Levit et al., State Health Expenditure Accounts: Building Blocks
for State Health Spending Analysis, 17 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 201, 231
(1995).

15.

GOVERNOR'S REPORT,

16.

John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Medicaid, 328 NEw

J. MED.

supra note 1, at Appendix C-4.
ENG.

896, 896-900 (1993).
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charity and bad debt costs, this difference is shifted to privatepay patients, particularly through higher admission and other
charges, like those ten-dollar aspirins many have seen on their
hospital bills. While conclusive data on these costs is not available, a public-payor survey conducted by the Hospital Research
Foundation to estimate the MA shortfalls reported that statewide payments to Pennsylvania hospitals amounted to only seventy-five percent of costs for hospital inpatient care and fortynine percent of costs for hospital outpatient care in 1987.17 The
Hospital Association of Pennsylvania estimated that in 1991,
contractual allowances (the difference between a hospital's actual charges and the amount of payment received from insurers
such as medical assistance, Medicare, and Blue Cross) were
about forty-five percent of gross patient revenue. That is to say,
forty-five cents on every dollar was lost due to these underpayments. The PHCCCC puts that loss at about $7.5 billion. 18
Charity and bad debt costs for acute care hospitals (for the
uninsured and insured alike) were estimated at $311.4 million in
1985.19 The PHCCCC estimates a more recent figure to be
closer to $500 million. 20 These costs, in addition to the MA
shortfall, are also absorbed by the system in the form of costshifting to private-pay patients. In a properly reformed health
care system with explicit and comprehensive financing, these
hidden costs would not exist. Prices would fall as shortfalls and
cost-shifting were eliminated. As providers would be paid the
actual cost of care for all patients, ten-dollar aspirin charges
should disappear. Requiring individuals to be responsible for
their health care as part of the social contract to protect the interests of the community is socially correct, just as it is right to
require automobile insurance. But in the car insurance example, the requirement has not been enforced. Instead, an explicit
cost-shifting mechanism was developed (uninsured motorist
coverage) at the expense of individuals who do their part. This
undermines the requirement in principle, is unfair, and diminishes the effectiveness of the system. Equicare solves this problem with enforcement provisions, addressed below.
In the medical assistance program, the first Pennsylvania
Medicaid managed care experience served 200,000 MA recipi17.

PHCCCC

REPORT,

supra note 2, at 3-4 to 3-5.

18. Telephone Interview with James Magee of the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost
Containment Council (July 21, 1993) [hereinafter "Magee"].
19. PHCCCC REPORT, supra note 2, at Exhibit 3.1.
20. Magee, supra note 18.
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ents and included the HealthPASS program.2 ' One national
study has shown that Medicaid managed care per-member costs
were five to fifteen percent lower than conventional Medicaid
program per-member costs, attributable to less emergency room
use and lower hospital rates.22 But other studies show savings
only with staff- or group-model health maintenance organizations (HMOs), or raise questions about savings.23
HealthPASS, started in 1986 and due to expire in December
1996, is a "Medicaid-only prepaid managed care health program" for parts of Philadelphia. 24 HealthPASS has saved some
costs: in a comprehensive review conducted by the Government
Accounting Office in 1993, the Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare had estimated that from July 1989 through December 1991, HealthPASS saved the state $26.3 million and the
federal government $15.1 million. Projected savings for 1992
were $15.2 and $9.5 million, respectively. 25 But segregated approaches to care do not seem to be an answer to what ails us.
Poverty and social ills from violence and drugs to AIDS and
homelessness strain our health care system like no other system
in the world. 6 No system works harder or spends more to try to
keep up. For example, it costs about $63,000 to treat a drugexposed baby for just the first five years of life, and it is estimated that nationally there are at least 375,000 such babies, for
a total cost of about $25 billion. This problem, like most of our
other problems, barely exists in other countries.2 7 We must do
better.
II.

EQUICARE: QUALITY HEALTH CARE AND
CONSUMER CHOICE

As a proconsumer, market-based approach to health system
reform, Equicare puts policy into practice on a state level, build21.

GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 1, at

5.

22. George Anders, Many States Embrace Managed Care System for Medicaid Patients, WALL. ST. J., June 11, 1993, at Al.
23. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: STATES TURN TO MANAGED
CARE TO IMPROVE ACCESS AND CONTROL COSTS, GAO/HRD-93-46, at 8-9 (Mar.
1993); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID HEALTHPASS: AN EVALUATION
OF A MANAGED CARE PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN PHILADELPHIA RECIPIENTS, GAO/

HRD-93-67, at 16 (May 1993).
24. MEDICAID HEALTHPASS, supra note 23, at 15.
25. Id. at 16.
26. Leroy L. Schwartz, The Medical Costs of America's Social Ills, WALL.
June 24, 1991, at A10.
27. Id.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol5/iss1/8
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ing on some concepts from Mark Pauly and others 28 and29the
Heritage Foundation's national approach to health reform.
Under Equicare, state government is neither a player on the
field (running or wholly financing health care) nor a spectator
(doing nothing) but, rather, a referee assuring access and providing appropriate oversight and regulation. In this context, the
delivery of health care is largely left to providers and the health
care industry.
Acute care medical assistance would be folded into Equicare,
but Pennsylvanians would continue to participate in Medicare.
Long-term care, about thirty percent of the medical assistance
budget ($1.75 billion per year), would continue to be provided.
Eventually, if meaningful private insurance products develop for
long-term care, a voucher approach should be examined for this
as well.
Here is how Equicare would meet its goal of quality health
care for all.
Universal access/responsibilityto obtain coverage
The state would create a structure that assures that all Pennsylvanians have access to health care and would provide financial and other assistance as necessary. In return, individuals and
families would be required to obtain insurance (though they
could do so through employment or other groups). The state
would verify this by requiring all families and individuals to submit proof of coverage (or a request for assistance with a demonstration of need) with their state tax return, even if they have no
tax liability.
Society has a right to require that individuals be responsible
for their health care. The days of cost-shifting will be gone:
there will be no more shortfalls, charity care, or uncompensated
care. Gone would be, for example, the free ride of Timothy McCoy, who dropped his insurance coverage because of the expense, came to need an operation for a herniated disk, was
surprised that the hospital absorbed the $20,000 cost, but, at age
thirty-four with a salary of $30,000 a year, still refused to
purchase insurance 30-his experience under the current system
28. Mark Pauly et al., A Plan for "Responsible National Health Insurance,"
HEALTH AFFAIRS, Spring 1991, at 5-25.
29. Stuart M. Butler, A Policy Maker's Guide to the Health Care Crisis-Part
One: The Debate Over Reform (Heritage Foundation, Feb. 1992).

30. Steinmetz, supra note 8, at Al.
Published by LAW eCommons, 1996
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proved that it was economically wiser to go "bare." The resulting system will be a more equitable one-everyone who can will
contribute, and all will have their basic needs met.
Guaranteedbasic health coverage

Not having insurance or having insufficient insurance can result in delayed care and sicker patients. It often also means an
eventual need for more expensive and inefficient care and,
again, ultimately shifts the cost to the community. A minimum
level of health insurance would be required. Individuals will select their plans based on their needs, Ala "cafeteria" style insurance plans. Individuals could purchase insurance from whatever
sources they like, including employers who choose to continue
to offer it or to serve as a broker of coverage options. To ensure
that each family or individual is well protected, health insurance
tax credits or vouchers will be issued by the state, based upon

income.31

The state would require that the basic minimum insurance
policy include the following categories of coverage: basic inpatient and outpatient care, physician and other licensed practitioner services, diagnostic tests, preventive care, emergency
care, home health care, and prescription drugs. Voucher levels
would reflect national average monthly premiums for a particular year; minimum policies would reflect at least the comprehensiveness and depth of current policies of average cost. 32
Elimination of unfair tax incentives

Requiring individuals to purchase their own insurance replaces the current system in which health insurance is tax-exempt income only to those whose employers provide it, without
any limits or considerations of need. Individuals who have employer-provided insurance receive a tax break that those without such insurance do not, irrespective of income, and the use of
pretax dollars has encouraged people to overinsure. Under
Equicare, the system would rely on progressive financing and
contain incentives for cost consciousness and for economic development in the state.
Families or individuals not receiving health insurance wages
and with an income below $25,000 per year, medical assistance
31.
32.

See Pauly, supra note 28, at 9-12.
See infra part III.
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recipients, the unemployed, and anyone else demonstrating financial need would receive a state-issued voucher to purchase
health insurance. Those with vouchers would purchase insurance from among the same health insurance options as everyone
else.33 Physicians and other health care providers who routinely
refuse to accept Medicaid patients because of low reimbursement levels would be reimbursed at the same level to treat
(what was) this population. Providers may not want to care for
poor patients for other (unethical) reasons, but there would no
longer be a financial disincentive for doing so. Persons receiving
no health insurance wages but earning between $25,000 and
$40,000 per year would receive a state income tax credit to help
defray the costs of health insurance.
The Department of Insurance would contract with the lowest
bidder among insurers to choose one who would serve as a
"fallback insurer," providing coverage to those who fail to buy
34
their own insurance but would not be eligible for a voucher.
The premium plus a penalty for not securing coverage would be
collected through the state tax system.
As mentioned above, employers would get out of the business
of assuming risk for health care. This is not to say they would
have no involvement: they would be able, and encouraged, to
act as brokers in presenting health insurance plans to their employees for their consideration, thus maintaining the beneficial
effect of large-group purchasing. They could offer health insurance, including a self-insured plan, as an employee benefit, and
employees would have the option of using the health insurance
wages to purchase those plans.
Employers with more than twenty-five employees would be
required to pay as income to employees ninety percent of the
money they are now paying toward health insurance premiums.
This nontaxed income would be separately designated as a line
item on the paycheck, and as health insurance wages on state
tax forms at the end of the year. Employers with less than
twenty-five workers would qualify for small business assistance,
under which they would only have to turn over funds to employees earning more than $25,000 per year. Most of these health
insurance wages would remain in the hands of employees for the
purchase of insurance and would cover other health care expenses. All employers who pay health insurance wages would
33.
34.

See Pauly, supra note 28, at 13-14; Butler, supra note 29, at 3.
See Pauly, supra note 28, at 11.
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turn over to the state ten percent of their premium costs under
the current system to help fund vouchers for the poor and currently uninsured. Most families would end up at least breaking
even, if not gaining financially because of this new source of income. Tax preference for health benefits would not be lost; instead, families would find themselves in a new and, in most
cases, better financial situation with respect to their health care
expenses.
The employer who offers coverage could still deduct the
amount applied to premiums and, therefore, would have an incentive to make the offer. However, it would not be liable for
changing premium costs, spending time and money tracking utilization, or making decisions about the content of policies, because employees would be the purchasers. Employers and
employees will come to negotiate about total compensation
packages, and those employers who offer attractive allotments
for insurance, and therefore higher total compensation packages, would compete more successfully for employees. Subject
to Internal Revenue Service waiver, health insurance wages,
now a form of income, would be free from federal income taxation. By state law, health insurance wages would not be subject
to state or local personal income or wage tax.
Portability of coverage, without formal ties to employment
Like life insurance or a mortgage, health coverage should not
be lost because of a job change. Under these reforms, coverage
would not be formally tied to employment. Consumers could
select coverage from anywhere, including an employer if it is
offered. If they purchase insurance on their own, they will automatically be able to carry that coverage from job to job. If they
choose to be covered through an employer, they will have the
right to continue that coverage if they change employment. The
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, 35
which currently provides for the continuation of group insurance coverage for certain employees and their dependents, exemplifies this type of scheme; however, this is a time-limited
extension that runs for only eighteen or thirty-six months, depending on the qualifying event.

35.

29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1161-69 (West Supp. 1996).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol5/iss1/8

12

19961

Snyder: Equicare: A Model for Quality Health Care and Consumer Choice in

Equicare: State Health System Reform

Free choice for consumers and cost containment through
competition and the market
Consumers would be free to choose whatever health plan they
prefer and would serve as a force for cost control by seeking the
best price, level, and quality of coverage. Some would be willing
to restrict their choice of doctor, for example, in order to get the
cost savings associated with an HMO. Individuals could choose
plans that are tailored to their needs. Thus, single men would
not get stuck with policies that include prenatal care, childless
couples could decline pediatric coverage, and so on, as people
address their changing needs over the years. Health insurers
and providers would compete in innovative ways and respond to
patient demand.
In the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program (FEHBP),
covering ten million federal workers and their families plus retirees, a wide range of plans is offered and strong competition
has held down cost increases to approximately one-third to onehalf less than increases in company-sponsored plans.3 6 Costs are
also kept low because the FEHBP is not subject to state-mandated benefit laws,3 7 which require plans to include, as a matter
of law, particular services and coverage for certain types of
providers. Equicare includes the strengths of the federal program, but goes much farther.
Real health security for the elderly
As detailed under section III below, Equicare would build
into health reform a new level of health security for the elderly.
Under Equicare, nearly 1.3 million of Pennsylvania's 1.8 million
citizens over the age of sixty-five-seniors with incomes below
$25,000 per year-would receive a voucher for the private
purchase of "Medigap" insurance covering the costs left uncovered by the federal Medicare program. Consistent with the
overall Equicare approach, seniors would be able to choose
from a variety of levels of fee-for-service or managed care plans
and, depending on that choice, could retain some of the voucher
amount for out-of-pocket expenses. This major increase in
health resources for the elderly would replace the PACE program, a limited, leaky safety net program covering prescriptions
36. Robert E. Moffit, Consumer Choice in Health: Learning From the FederalEmployee Health Benefits Program,HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER No. 878, Feb. 6,
1992, at 14.
37. Id. at 16.
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for a much smaller percentage of the elderly population in
Pennsylvania (single people with annual incomes below $13,000
and couples with incomes below $16,200).38
Increased consumer awareness of health care choices and costs
Once a third party is no longer the purchaser, real markets in
health care would develop. Today, many patients have no incentive to care about costs-someone else picks up the tab.
Often, patients have no idea what their employers pay for health
care premiums, let alone for a particular procedure or test.
Likewise, health care providers usually have no incentive to
think about or discuss costs.
How would consumers choose under Equicare? They would
select a comprehensive plan after shopping around and, if they
desire, after seeking advice from an expert, as they currently do
for other forms of insurance and as federal workers now do for
health plans. Health advisors or trusted sellers might include
plan sponsors, such as unions, religious groups, or membership
organizations; employee benefits consultants; consumer organizations; doctors; or insurance brokers. 39 But because individuals
would choose among various plans on the basis of cost, quality,
and type of coverage desired, they would have a stake in their
health care like never before. They might choose a plan with
high copayments and deductibles in order to minimize premium
costs and would, therefore, come to care about whether a specific service was truly needed, encouraging dialogues with providers that would make them more informed consumers.
Studies have shown that the less a patient pays (or even
knows) about health care costs and the more "subsidizing" that
occurs, the more consumption and costs go up.4 0 For example,
based upon an analysis of medical insurance expenditures
among the insured (per person and of similar age), the lowest
costs were found for individuals who insured themselves,
followed by large-group, small-group, Medicaid (acute care
only), and Medicare (with drugs and supplemental insurance)
populations. 1
38.

72

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 3762-302 (1994).

39. See Butler, supra note 29, at 6-7.
40. Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insuranceand the Demandfor Medical Care:
Evidence From a Randomized Experiment, AM. ECON. REV., June 1987, at 251, 269.
41. Id. at 263.
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No rationing

No government-imposed global budgets. No price controls.
No government rationing.
Commentators use varying definitions for the term "rationing." Some define health care rationing to mean practices that
limit the supply or accessibility of medical services or goods.4
This definition, however, is so overbroad as to be largely unhelpful. It includes, for example, not providing ineffective treatment or a referral that a patient might nonetheless want, or not
providing futile care.43 Likewise, some people say the large
number of uninsured results from implicit rationing, but this
confuses rationing with access issues. Incorporating the notion
of beneficial care into the definition of rationing-that is, as the
deliberate restriction of beneficial medical care"4-is still of limited assistance. Under this view, compliance with a patient's refusal of treatment based on an advance directive is rationing.
So, too, might be adherence to a clinical practice guideline that
does not recommend screening of certain populations, or not acceding to medically inappropriate patient demands for specific
care or a referral to a specialist.
Irrespective of consensus on an overarching definition of rationing, however, an example of policy that is, and should be,
flatly rejected by Americans is a random restriction on care
based on age, such as dialysis prohibitions that providers in Britain have integrated into the standard of care because of governmental cost constraints. Neither should Americans accept limits
in research, innovation, and quality.
We do currently see price controls in the form of the Medicare system's prospective payment diagnostic reimbursement
groups and they have not worked-Medicare costs overall have
spiraled out of control and are the focus of intense budget de42.

See, e.g.,Victor R. Fuchs, The "Rationing" of Medical Care, 311 NEW ENG. J.
1572 (1984); Henry Aaron & William B. Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The
Choice Before Us, 247 SCIENCE 418 (1990). But see Daniel P. Sulmasy, Physicians,
Cost Control,and Ethics, 116 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 920, 925 (1992) (criticizing
this approach).
43. Nancy S. Jecker & Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Futility and Rationing, 92 AM.
J. MED. 189, 190 (1992).
44. Douglas Besharov & Jessica Dunsay Silver, Rationing Access to Advanced
Medical Techniques, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 507 (1987); Daniel Callahan, Rationing Medical
Progress: The Way to Affordable Health Care, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1810 (1990);
David Orentlicher, Rationing and the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 217 JAMA 308
(1994).
MED.
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bate.45 Medicare for Pennsylvanians would remain intact under
Equicare, an issue for another day.
Protecting consumer choice through appropriate
insurance regulation
In a strongly competitive market, insurers that try to charge
excessive fees will not be able to compete. But with true competition comes a need for some regulation to safeguard the interests of consumers. Under Equicare all insurers would have to
adhere to state standards that protect consumers against fraud
and abuse. The following "game rules" would be put in place as
added responsibilities for the Department of Insurance to
enforce.
All health plans would be required to guarantee renewal, with
premium increases that do not exceed the average for all participants, ensuring that people can "transport" their coverage and
keep their coverage at reasonable rates should they become
sick. All individuals currently insured would have the option of
continuing with their current plan, even if the plan is offered
through an employer. Insurers would be permitted to use risk
rating, but only within legislated limits: insurers could not
charge more than twenty-five percent above or below the average charged for new enrollees. So, sick families could not be
charged more than twenty-five percent above the rate charged
similar families of average health.46
A patient protection fund, financed by insurers and self-insurers and administered by the Department of Insurance, would be
established as a backup to any health insurance plan that becomes insolvent, to assure continuity of coverage.47 The state
would also oversee advertising claims to protect consumers.
Elimination of waste
This reformed system could encourage healthier individuals to
choose health insurance plans with lower premiums and higher
deductibles and copayments. Thus, individuals might pay for
more of their actual medical expenses out of their own pockets.
45. John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: The Struggle to Reform Medicare, 334
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1071-75 (1996); Michael Wines, PoliticalStakes Increase in Fight to
Save Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1996, at Al.
46. See Stuart M. Butler, A Policy Maker's Guide to the Health Care Crisis-Part
Two: The Heritage Consumer Choice Health Plan 12-13 (Heritage Foundation, Mar.
1992).
47. See Pauly, supra note 28, at 17.
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This could also increase consumerism as well as lower administrative costs, as fewer claims would be made.
It is also clear that the current systems, especially current government programs, foster irrationality in health care decisions,
such as the Medicare requirement that favors oxygen administration in the hospital (at a cost of $900 per day) over oxygen at
home (at $250 per day).
Clinical autonomy and reduced paperwork for health
care providers
Physicians have been an easy target for the wrong kinds of
cost containment-when looking for a quick fix, their clinical
judgments are second-guessed on the basis of cost factors. Utilization review, with its forms and toll-free telephone lines, has
become big business. If proper incentives and real competition
can be built into the health care system, there would be less obsession with bureaucratic cost control.
Third-party payers have a right to ensure medical appropriateness, but must do so in a scientifically based manner and with
much more attention to the quality of care. It is, however, the
physician who ultimately bears responsibility for the patient's
welfare. That is as it should be-but the flip side is that the
physician's clinical authority and the physician-patient relationship must be preserved. The system must ensure true quality
review and not just cost savings, and research on new approaches to review, such as profiling patterns of care instead of
case-by-case scrutiny, is needed.
Practice guidelines should also be further developed and used.
"Cookbook" medicine should never replace the art and science
of medicine, but practice guidelines developed by physicians for
physicians have the potential to improve medical practice, help
reduce adverse events that could become the subject of litigation, and reduce so-called defensive medicine.
Excessive paperwork and claims forms create aggravation and
high costs. Under Equicare, a model reimbursement form for
claims would be developed for use by all plans to replace the
current paper hodgepodge of 1500 to 2000 different claims forms
that now exist nationally.
No state mandates for specific services or provider types
Current state-mandated benefit laws, which greatly drive up
unnecessary utilization and costs, would be eliminated and conPublished by LAW eCommons, 1996
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sumers would be able to choose the health benefits that they
value instead of having to accept a plan that includes specific
coverage they do not want but that was mandated by the state.
This is no small matter. Pennsylvania has twenty-two such
laws. 48 Maryland mandates thirty-three different services and
provider types, including, for example, alcoholism treatment
and in vitro fertilization. It has been estimated that these mandates increase the costs of an average health care plan by seventeen to twenty-seven percent.49
State laws restricting selective contracting and managed care
plans should also be eliminated. Under "any willing provider"
statutes, for example, managed care organizations are required
to accept any provider willing to abide by the terms of the managed care contract. However, limitations on the types and numbers of providers and the ability to select cost-conscious
providers are ways in which managed care organizations control
costs. 50 A recent study found that administrative costs alone for
a typical Independent Practice Association, or IPA, model
HMO would rise by forty-three percent under an "any willing
provider" mandate. 51
Government administration

The State's Departments of Health and Insurance would have
responsibility for the selected new functions required by Equicare. The Department of Health would put into place the necessary structure to set the stage for Equicare: obtaining Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, Medicaid, and IRS waivers;
establishing an ad hoc clinical advisory board to determine minimum benefits levels with community input; establishing a board
to finalize the health insurance voucher and credit rates; and disassembling the Department of Aging's PACE program (replaced under Equicare with a voucher for the purchase of
"Medigap" insurance by most of the state's elderly, as explained
above), the current state bureaucracies involved in the direct
provision of care through health centers, drug and alcohol pro48. State Initiatives in Health CareReform, ISSUE BRIEF No. 127 (Employee Benefits Research Institute), June-July 1992, at 25.
49. Robert E. Moffit, Why the Maryland Consumer Choice Plan Could Be a
Model for Health Care Reform 13 (Heritage Foundation, Mar. 1992).
50. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF MANAGED CARE: AN UPDATE 10 (Mar. 1994).
51. The Cost Impact of "Any Willing Provider" Legislation (Atkinson & Co.,
Washington, D.C., June 27, 1994) (report by consulting firm).
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grams, and the massive Department of Public Welfare's Medical
Assistance bureaucracy (except for an income verification and
distribution of voucher and insurance information function that
could be retained by the Department of Public Welfare).
The Department of Health would administer the long-term
care component of Medicaid, and would oversee the rerouting
of state and federal funds that would be used to pay for the uninsured. This plan would leave in place preventive health services (including school health services), health support services,
health research, in-home services for the elderly, and the state
mental health/mental retardation systems. The health care data
collection and dissemination functions of the Pennsylvania
Health Care Cost Containment Council, as well as a new emphasis on activities in public education about health insurance
options, would be integrated into the Department of Health.
The Department of Insurance would oversee the new insurance regulations detailed above.
III.

FINANCING EQUICARE

Equicare would provide for the uninsured, provide financial
assistance through vouchers or tax credits (depending on income) to those who need it, and give tax preference for the
purchase of health insurance for all those presently with employer-paid health insurance wages. The money needed to do
this would come through the rationalizing of health care costs
(making financing explicit and eliminating reimbursement
shortfalls and uncompensated care); the use of current state and
federal funds; and the reduction of overall costs (eliminating the
bureaucracy and waste of Medicaid and getting the state out of
the business of providing care through, for example, health centers and drug and alcohol centers). It would be augmented by
personal resources gained from the new treatment of health insurance wages, allowing most families to break even or gain financially while raising dollars for the state.
Savings would also be achieved through increased consumer
awareness and cost sharing, real competition for health insurance, incentives for preventive care, screening and wellness programs, incentives for providers to control costs, and the slowing
of the overall growth of costs.
Because this is real reform of the entire system, the state
would have significant savings. A slower rate of growth can be
anticipated for Equicare voucher spending as compared with the
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soaring costs of the current medical assistance program. Equicare would limit the growth of voucher costs (aside from demographic changes) to the average rate of increase of privately
purchased health insurance. As the present Federal Employee
Health Benefits Program demonstrates, consumer choice and
market power do work in health care.
The likely influx of new business could potentially produce
substantial additional revenues to support Equicare and other
state projects, although this new business tax revenue has not
been relied on in determining the feasibility of52Equicare.
This is how the dollars for Equicare add up.
Equicarefunding
Funding for Equicare would come from redirecting existing
state and federal dollars from the bureaucracies already in place
and from the uninsured coverage pool of already allocated employer dollars, as described below. Existing funding for medical
assistance, with the exception of long-term care (thirty percent
of the 1993-94 MA budget, according to the Pennsylvania Bureau of Financial Operations' Division of Budget), would be
transferred to Equicare, as would the public funds listed in Appendix 1. Total state and federal funds would provide $4.5 billion for Equicare. The ten percent contribution from health
insurance wages would provide $1.15 billion, for a total of more
than $5.6 billion. The estimated total cost of Equicare is $5.5
billion.
Equicare costs
Vouchers
Equicare will assure that all Pennsylvanians have basic health
insurance coverage without the bureaucracy and waste of the
current system. Pennsylvanians must demonstrate proof of coverage, thus eliminating the need for the system and the state to
"absorb" the inefficient costs of the uninsured. The (tax-free)
vouchers, which are based upon income level, would provide
funds for lower-income families 53 and individuals who do not receive health insurance wages to purchase a basic health insur52. These numbers are based upon 1993 statistics, which were relevant for the
1994 gubernatorial primary.

53. The term "family" is based upon current legal definitions. For example, domestic partners would not qualify as a family, but rather as two individuals.
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ance plan of their choice.54 Equicare vouchers would be
provided annually, based on age and annual income, as follows:
65 YEARS OF AGE
Families earning less than $25,000 per year
Individuals earning less than $15,000
Individuals earning $15,000 to $24,999
UNDER

$4200
$1700
$1200

65 YEARS OLD AND OVER
(Would continue to receive Medicare; vouchers would be used for
Medigap policies)
Individuals earning less than $15,000
$1000
Individuals earning $15,000 to $25,000
$800
These voucher levels reflect an assessment that nonelderly
low-income families and individuals would be able to select
from a range of quality health insurance plans (all meeting the
minimum coverage categories) for a first-year cost of $4200 and
$1700, respectively, based on estimated national average
monthly premiums for 1994, by plan type:
National Average Premiums

55

Conventional (Indemnity)
Insurance
Group/Staff HMO
Monthly
Annual
Monthly
Annual
Individual
$149
$1788
$130
$1560
Family
$351
$4212
$348
$4176
The total cost of the vouchers is estimated at approximately
$5.3 billion, as indicated in Appendix 2.
Tax credits
Persons receiving no health insurance wages but earning between $25,000 and $40,000 per year would receive a state income tax credit to help defray the costs of their health
insurance. These credits would reduce the Pennsylvania personal income tax as follows:
54. As explained in the next section, Equicare's tax credits will assist middle-income Pennsylvanians who do not receive health insurance wages from an employer.
55. HEALTH INS. ASS'N OF AM., SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA
(1995).
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TAX CREDIT

(Under 65 years of age)
Individuals earning $25,000 to $34,999
Individuals earning $35,000 to $39,999
Families earning $25,000 to $39,999

$500
$300
Full tax liability
up to $1000

Precise data does not exist for estimating the total cost of
these tax credits. Based on available data on the number of
Pennsylvanians employed by small businesses offering no health
benefits and national data regarding the income breakdown of
the uninsured, this financing estimate assumes that there would
be 200,000 Pennsylvanians eligible for tax credits for health insurance at an average cost of $500 per credit. Using these assumptions, the total cost of the tax credit program to the state,
then, would be $100 million in the initial year.
Health insurance wages
Pennsylvanians who receive health insurance benefits from
their employers would receive ninety percent of those current
benefits in the form of pretax health insurance wages, designated as an additional line item of compensation and declared
(but treated as tax-free) on state and federal income tax forms.
The remaining ten percent would be paid by employers into a
state uninsured coverage pool to help defray the costs of the
vouchers and tax credits, which ensure universal coverage. This
ten percent is estimated at $1.15 billion, based on total estimated employer-paid health premiums in Pennsylvania in 1993
of $11.5 billion. These figures are derived from an estimated
employer share (twenty-eight percent) of the total 1993 state
health expenditures of approximately $41 billion.
CONCLUSION

Equicare, based on Pennsylvania data, would provide a consumer-oriented, market-based state model worth trying. It
would assure access to health care by providing a structure that
allows each individual or family to purchase coverage that is tailored to their specific needs. The same advantages in buying
insurance for cars, home, and life would come to health care.
The cost of insurance would in many cases come down. Segregated approaches to care would end. And, most importantly,
quality and efficient care would be available to all.
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol5/iss1/8

22

Snyder: Equicare: A Model for Quality Health Care and Consumer Choice in

1996]

Equicare: State Health System Reform
APPENDIX 1
SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR EQUICARE BASED ON
STATE AND FEDERAL HEALTH CARE

APPROPRIATIONS,

1992-1993

State:

Medical Assistance
Children's Health Ins
PACE
Health Treatment Services
Drug & Alcohol Services

$3,018,885,000
29,300,000
200,000,000
37,572,000
32,941,000
3,318,698,000

Federal.
Medical Assistance
Children's Health Ins
Health Treatment Services
Drug & Alcohol Services

2,828,351,000
4,800,000
753,000
76,146,000
2,910,050,000

Total Existing Funds:
Total Medical Assistance
Adjust for Long-Term Care (1)
Adjustment

$6,228,748,000
5,847,236,000
30.0%
(1,754,170,800)

Available Existing Funds:

$4,474,577,200

Additional Revenue (2):

1,150,000,000

Total Revenue for Equicare:
Total Cost of Vouchers:
Total Cost of Tax Credits
Medical Assistance Admin (3)
Total Cost of Equicare:
Surplus

$5,624,577,200
$5,366,051,985
100,000,000
100,000,000
$5,566,051,985
$58,525,215

(1) Long term care under the Medical Assistance program will remain intact.
(2) Uninsured Coverage Premium Pool.
(3) Although it is expected that Equicare will be less costly to administer than the
existing Medical Assistance Program, the same approximate amount of
administrative costs have been used for these purposes.
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